Please note that this describes the 1st generation Nmap OS Fingerprinting system. We are now (July 2006) finishing up a 2nd generation system for Nmap, which has much better documentation here.
Remote OS detection via TCP/IP Stack FingerPrinting
by Fyodor <email@example.com> (insecure.org)
Written: October 18, 1998
Last Modified: June 11, 2002
[French Translation by Arhuman <arhuman&at&netcourrier.com>]
[Portuguese Translation by Frank Ned <frank&at&absoluta.org>]
[Italian Translation by Rige <rigel&at&penguinpowered.com>]
[Russian Translation by Alex Volkov <alex&at&nmap.ru>]
[Spanish Translation by Marco Barbosa <mabs&at&hotmail.com>]
[German Translation by Stefan Maly <stefan&at&maly.de>]
[Chinese (Simplified) Translation by neko <neko&at&126.com>]
[Chinese (Traditional) Translation by George Chou <georgechou2000&at&sinamail.com>]
[Turkish Translation by Egemen Tas <egement&at&karyde.com.tr>]
[Hebrew Translation by Elad]
[Japanese Translation by Yoriyuki Sakai <sakai&at&lac.co.jp>
and Hiromi Yanaoka <yanaoka&at&lac.co.jp>]
[Polish Translation by
Pawel Wasylyszyn <wasylysp&at&wizard.ae.krakow.pl>]
by Khaidar Crezpo <khaidarc&at&yahoo.com>]
[Swedish Translation by Andre Johansen <Andre.Johansen&at&adm.oru.se>]
[Dutch Translation by Michael Jonker <majonker&at&euronet.nl>]
This paper may be freely distributed. The latest copy should always
be available at https://nmap.org/nmap-fingerprinting-article.html
This paper discusses how to glean precious information about a host by
querying its TCP/IP stack. I first present some of the "classical"
methods of determining host OS which do not involve stack
fingerprinting, then describe the current "state of the art" in stack
fingerprinting tools. Next comes a description of many techniques for
causing the remote host to leak information about itself. Finally I
detail my (nmap) implementation of this, followed by a snapshot gained
from nmap which discloses what OS is running on many popular Internet
Learning remote OS versions can be an extremely valuable network
reconnaissance tool, since many security holes are dependent on OS
version. Lets say you are doing a penetration test and find port 53
open. If this is a vulnerable version of Bind, you only have one shot
to exploit it since a failed attempt is likely to crash the daemon.
With a good TCP/IP fingerprinter, you will quickly find that this
machine is running 'Solaris 2.51' or 'Linux 2.0.35' and can adjust
your shellcode accordingly.
A worse possibility is someone scanning 500,000 hosts in advance to
see what OS is running and what ports are open. Then when someone
posts (say) a root hole in Sun's comsat daemon, our little cracker
could grep his list for 'UDP/512' and 'Solaris 2.6' and he immediately
has pages and pages of rootable boxes. It should be noted that this
is SCRIPT KIDDIE behavior. You have demonstrated no skill and nobody
is even remotely impressed that you were able to find some vulnerable
.edu that had not patched the hole in time. Also, people will be even
less impressed if you use your newfound access to deface the
department's web site with a self-aggrandizing rant about how damn
good you are and how stupid the sysadmins must be.
Another possible use is for social engineering. Lets say that you are
scanning your target company and Nmap reports a 'Datavoice TxPORT
PRISM 3000 T1 CSU/DSU 6.22/2.06'. The hacker might now call up the
target pretending to be 'Datavoice support' and discuss some issues
about their PRISM 3000. "We are going to announce a security hole
soon, but first we want all our current customers to install the patch
-- I just mailed it to you ..." Some naive administrators might
assume that only an authorized engineer from Datavoice would know so
much about their CSU/DSU.
Another potential use of this capability is evaluation of companies
you may want to do business with. Before you choose a new ISP, scan
them and see what equipment is in use. Those "$99/year" deals don't
sound nearly so good when you find out they have crappy routers and
offer PPP services off a bunch of Windows boxes.
Stack fingerprinting solves the problem of OS identification in a
unique way. I think this technique holds the most promise, but there
are currently many other solutions. Sadly, this is still one the most
effective of those techniques:
playground~> telnet hpux.u-aizu.ac.jp
Trying 18.104.22.168 ...
Connected to hpux.u-aizu.ac.jp.
Escape character is '^]'.
HP-UX hpux B.10.01 A 9000/715 (ttyp2)
There is no point going to all this trouble of fingerprinting if the
machine will blatantly announce to the world exactly what it is
running! Sadly, many vendors ship current systems with these
kind of banners and many admins fail to turn them off. Just because
there are other ways to figure out what OS is running (such as
fingerprinting), does not mean we should announce our OS and
architecture to every schmuck who tries to connect.
The problems with relying on this technique are that an increasing
number of people are turning banners off, many systems don't give much
information, and it is trivial for someone to "lie" in their banners.
Even if you turn off the banners, many applications will happily give
away this kind of information when asked. For example lets look at an
payfonez> telnet ftp.netscape.com 21
Trying 22.214.171.124 ...
Connected to ftp.netscape.com.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 ftp29 FTP server (UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0) ready.
215 UNIX Type: L8 Version: SUNOS
First of all, it gives us system details in its default banner. Then
if we give the 'SYST' command it happily feeds back even more information.
If anon FTP is supported, we can often download /bin/ls or other
binaries and determine what architecture it was built for.
Many other applications are too free with information. Take web
servers for example:
playground> echo 'GET / HTTP/1.0\n' | nc hotbot.com 80 | egrep '^Server:'
Hmmm ... I wonder what OS they are running.
Other classic techniques include DNS host info records (rarely
effective) and social engineering. If the machine is listening on
161/udp (snmp), you are almost guaranteed a bunch of detailed info
using 'snmpwalk' from the CMU SNMP tools distribution and the 'public'
CURRENT FINGERPRINTING PROGRAMS
Nmap is not the first OS recognition program to use TCP/IP
fingerprinting. The common IRC spoofer sirc by Johan has included
very rudimentary fingerprinting techniques since version 3 (or
earlier). It attempts to place a host in the classes "Linux",
"4.4BSD", "Win95", or "Unknown" using a few simple TCP flag tests.
Another such program is checkos, released publicly in January of this
year by Shok in Confidence Remains High Issue #7.
The fingerprinting techniques are exactly the same as SIRC, and even
the code is identical in many places. Checkos was privately
available for a long time prior to the public release, so I have no
idea who swiped code from whom. But neither seems to credit the
other. One thing checkos does add is telnet banner checking, which is
useful but has the problems described earlier. [ Update: Shok wrote in
to say that chekos was never intended to be public and this is why he
didn't bother to credit SIRC for some of the code. ]
Su1d also wrote an OS checking program. His is called SS and as of
Version 3.11 it can identify 12 different OS types. I am somewhat
partial to this one since he credits my Nmap program for some of the
networking code :).
Then there is queso. This program is the newest and it is a huge leap
forward from the other programs. Not only do they introduce a couple
new tests, but they were the first (that I have seen) to move the
OS fingerprints out of the code. The other scanners included code like:
/* from ss */
if ((flagsfour & TH_RST) && (flagsfour & TH_ACK) && (winfour == 0) &&
(flagsthree & TH_ACK))
reportos(argv,argv,"Livingston Portmaster ComOS");
Instead, queso moves this into a configuration file which obviously
scales much better and makes adding an OS as easy as appending a few
lines to a fingerprint file.
Queso was written by Savage, one of the fine folks at Apostols.org .
One problem with all the programs describe above is that they are very
limited in the number of fingerprinting tests which limits the
granularity of answers. I want to know more than just 'this machine
is OpenBSD, FreeBSD, or NetBSD', I wish to know exactly which of those
it is as well as some idea of the release version number. In the same
way, I would rather see 'Solaris 2.6' than simply 'Solaris'. To
achieve this response granularity, I worked on a number of
fingerprinting techniques which are described in the next section.
There are many, many techniques which can be used to fingerprint
networking stacks. Basically, you just look for things that differ
among operating systems and write a probe for the difference. If you
combine enough of these, you can narrow down the OS very tightly. For
example nmap can reliably distinguish Solaris 2.4 vs. Solaris 2.5-2.51
vs Solaris 2.6. It can also tell Linux kernel 2.0.30 from 2.0.31-34
or 2.0.35. Here are some techniques:
The FIN probe -- Here we send a FIN packet (or any packet without an
ACK or SYN flag) to an open port and wait for a response. The
correct RFC 793 behavior is to NOT respond, but many broken
implementations such as MS Windows, BSDI, CISCO, HP/UX, MVS, and
IRIX send a RESET back. Most current tools utilize this
The BOGUS flag probe -- Queso is the first scanner I have seen to use
this clever test. The idea is to set an undefined TCP "flag" (
bit 7 or 8, counting from the left) in the TCP header of a SYN
packet. Linux boxes prior to 2.0.35 keep the flag set in their
response. I have not found any other OS to have this bug.
However, some operating systems seem to reset the connection when
they get a SYN+BOGUS packet. This behavior could be useful in
identifying them. Update: Bit 8 (and 9) are now used as the "ECN
field" for TCP congestion control.
TCP ISN Sampling -- The idea here is to find patterns in the initial
sequence numbers chosen by TCP implementations when responding to
a connection request. These can be categorized in to many groups
such as the traditional 64K (many old UNIX boxes), Random
increments (newer versions of Solaris, IRIX, FreeBSD, Digital
UNIX, Cray, and many others), True "random" (Linux 2.0.*, OpenVMS,
newer AIX, etc). Windows boxes (and a few others) use a "time
dependent" model where the ISN is incremented by a small fixed
amount each time period. Needless to say, this is almost as
easily defeated as the old 64K behavior. Of course my favorite
technique is "constant". The machines ALWAYS use the exact same
ISN :). I've seen this on some 3Com hubs (uses 0x803) and Apple
LaserWriter printers (uses 0xC7001).
You can also subclass groups such as random incremental by
computing variances, greatest common divisors, and other functions
on the set of sequence numbers and the differences between the
numbers. It should be noted that ISN generation has important
security implications. Nmap is the first program I have seen to
use this for OS identification.
IPID sampling -- Most operating systems increment a system-wide IPID
value for each packet they send. Others, such as OpenBSD, use a
random IPID and some systems (like Linux) use an IPID of 0 in
many cases where the "Donn't Fragment" bit is not set. Windows
does not put the IPID in network byte order, so it increments by
256 for each packet. Nmap also has categories for constant,
random positive integral, and unknown sequence classes.
Predictable IPID sequences have important security consequences
beyond OS detection. The Nmap "Idlescan" (-sI) feature is one
TCP Timestamp -- Another number that can be sequenced for OS detection
purposes is the TCP timestamp option values. Some systems do not
support the feature, others increment the value at frequencies of
2HZ, 100HZ, or 1000HZ, and still others return 0. Nmap also uses
this information to determine uptime values for the remote host.
Don't Fragment bit -- Many operating systems are starting to set the
IP "Don't Fragment" bit on some of the packets they send. This
gives various performance benefits (though it can also be annoying
-- this is why Nmap fragmentation scans do not work from Solaris
boxes). In any case, not all OS's do this and some do it in
different cases, so by paying attention to this bit we can glean
even more information about the target OS. I haven't seen this
one before either.
TCP Initial Window -- This simply involves checking the window size on
returned packets. Older scanners simply used a non-zero window on
a RST packet to mean "BSD 4.4 derived". Newer scanners such as
queso and nmap keep track of the exact window since it is actually
pretty constant by OS type. This test actually gives us a lot of
information, since some operating systems can be uniquely
identified by the window alone (for example, AIX is the only OS I
have seen which uses 0x3F25). In their "completely rewritten"
TCP stack for NT5, Microsoft uses 0x402E. Interestingly, that is
exactly the number used by OpenBSD and FreeBSD.
ACK Value -- Although you would think this would be completely
standard, implementations differ in what value they use for the
ACK field in some cases. For example, lets say you send a
FIN|PSH|URG to a closed TCP port. Most implementations will set
the ACK to be the same as your initial sequence number, though
Windows and some stupid printers will send your seq + 1. If you
send a SYN|FIN|URG|PSH to an open port, Windows is very
inconsistent. Sometimes it sends back your seq, other times it
sends S++, and still other times is sends back a seemingly random
value. One has to wonder what kind of code MS is writing that
changes its mind like this.
ICMP Error Message Quenching -- Some (smart) operating systems follow
the RFC 1812 suggestion to limit the rate at which various error
messages are sent. For example, the Linux kernel (in
net/ipv4/icmp.h) limits destination unreachable message generation
to 80 per 4 seconds, with a 1/4 second penalty if that is
exceeded. One way to test this is to send a bunch of packets to
some random high UDP port and count the number of unreachables
received. I have not seen this used before, and in fact I have
not added this to nmap (except for use in UDP port scanning).
This test would make the OS detection take a bit longer since you
need to send a bunch of packets and wait for them to return. Also
dealing with the possibility of packets dropped on the network
would be a pain.
ICMP Message Quoting -- The RFCs specify that ICMP error messages
quote some small amount of an ICMP message that causes various
errors. For a port unreachable message, almost all
implementations send only the required IP header + 8 bytes back.
However, Solaris sends back a bit more and Linux sends back even
more than that. The beauty with this is it allows nmap to
recognize Linux and Solaris hosts even if they don't have any
ICMP Error message echoing integrity -- I got this idea from something
Theo De Raadt (lead OpenBSD developer) posted to
comp.security.unix. As mentioned before, machines have to send
back part of your original message along with a port unreachable
error. Yet some machines tend to use your headers as 'scratch
space' during initial processing and so they are a bit warped by
the time you get them back. For example, AIX and BSDI send back an
IP 'total length' field that is 20 bytes too high. Some BSDI,
FreeBSD, OpenBSD, ULTRIX, and VAXen fuck up the IP ID that you sent
them. While the checksum is going to change due to the changed
TTL anyway, there are some machines (AIX, FreeBSD, etc.) which send
back an inconsistent or 0 checksum. Same thing goes with the UDP
checksum. All in all, nmap does nine different tests on the ICMP
errors to sniff out subtle differences like these.
Type of Service -- For the ICMP port unreachable messages I look at
the type of service (TOS) value of the packet sent back. Almost
all implementations use 0 for this ICMP error although Linux uses
0xC0. This does not indicate one of the standard TOS values, but instead is
part of the unused (AFAIK) precedence field. I do not know why
this is set, but if they change to 0 we will be able to keep
identifying the old versions and we will be able to identify
between old and new.
Fragmentation Handling -- This is a favorite technique of Thomas
H. Ptacek of Secure Networks, Inc (now owned by a bunch of Windows
users at NAI). This takes advantage of the fact that different
implementations often handle overlapping IP fragments differently.
Some will overwrite the old portions with the new, and in other
cases the old stuff has precedence. There are many different
probes you can use to determine how the packet was reassembled. I
did not add this capability since I know of no portable way to send
IP fragments (in particular, it is a bitch on Solaris). For more
information on overlapping fragments, you can read their IDS paper
TCP Options -- These are truly a gold mine in terms of leaking
information. The beauty of these options is that:
1) They are generally optional (duh!) :) so not all hosts implement
2) You know if a host implements them by sending a query with an
option set. The target generally show support of the option by
setting it on the reply.
3) You can stuff a whole bunch of options on one packet to test
everything at once.
Nmap sends these options along with almost every probe packet:
Window Scale=10; NOP; Max Segment Size = 265; Timestamp; End of Ops;
When you get your response, you take a look at which options were
returned and thus are supported. Some operating systems such as
recent FreeBSD boxes support all of the above, while others, such
as Linux 2.0.X support very few. The latest Linux 2.1.x kernels
do support all of the above. On the other hand, they are more
vulnerable to TCP sequence prediction. Go figure.
Even if several operating systems support the same set of options,
you can sometimes distinguish them by the values of the options.
For example, if you send a small MSS value to a Linux box, it will
generally echo that MSS back to you. Other hosts will give you
And even if you get the same set of supported options AND the same
values, you can still differentiate via the order that the
options are given, and where padding is applied. For example
Solaris returns 'NNTNWME' which means:
<no op><no op><timestamp><no op><window scale><echoed MSS>
While Linux 2.1.122 returns MENNTNW. Same options, same values,
but different order!
I have not seen any other OS detection tools utilizes TCP options,
but it is very useful.
There are a few other useful options I might probe for at some
point, such as those that support T/TCP and selective
Exploit Chronology -- Even with all the tests above, nmap is unable to
distinguish between the TCP stacks of Win95, WinNT, or Win98.
This is rather surprising, especially since Win98 came out about 4
years after Win95. You would think they would have bothered to
improve the stack in some way (like supporting more TCP options)
and so we would be able to detect the change and distinguish the
operating systems. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The NT
stack is apparently the same crappy stack they put into '95. And
they didn't bother to upgrade it for '98.
But do not give up hope, for there is a solution. You can simply
start with early Windows DOS attacks (Ping of Death, Winnuke, etc)
and move up a little further to attacks such as Teardrop and Land.
After each attack, ping them to see whether they have crashed.
When you finally crash them, you will likely have narrowed what
they are running down to one service pack or hotfix.
I have not added this functionality to nmap, although I must admit
it is very tempting :).
SYN Flood Resistance -- Some operating systems will stop accepting new
connections if you send too many forged SYN packets at them
(forging the packets avoids trouble with your kernel resetting the
connections). Many operating systems can only handle 8 packets.
Recent Linux kernels (among other operating systems) allow
various methods such as SYN cookies to prevent this from being a
serious problem. Thus you can learn something about your target
OS by sending 8 packets from a forged source to an open port and
then testing whether you can establish a connection to that port
yourself. This was not implemented in nmap since some people get
upset when you SYN flood them. Even explaining that you were
simply trying to determine what OS they are running might not help
NMAP IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
I have created a reference implementation of the OS detection
techniques mentioned above (except those I said were excluded). I
have added this to my Nmap scanner which has the advantage that it
already knows what ports are open and closed for fingerprinting so
you do not have to tell it. It is also portable among Linux, *BSD,
and Solaris 2.51 and 2.6, and some other operating systems.
The new version of Nmap reads a file filled with Fingerprint templates
that follow a simple grammar. Here is an example:
FingerPrint IRIX 6.2 - 6.4 # Thanks to Lamont Granquist
Lets look at the first line (I'm adding '>' quote markers):
> FingerPrint IRIX 6.2 - 6.3 # Thanks to Lamont Granquist
This simply says that the fingerprint covers IRIX versions 6.2 through
6.3 and the comment states that Lamont Granquist kindly sent me the IP
addresses or fingerprints of the IRIX boxes tested.
This means that ISN sampling put it in the "i800 class". This means
that each new sequence number is a multiple of 800 greater than the
The test is named T1 (for test1, clever eh?). In this test we send a
SYN packet with a bunch of TCP options to an open port. DF=N means
that the "Don't fragment" bit of the response must not be set.
W=C000|EF2A means that the window advertisement we received must
be 0xC000 or EF2A. ACK=S++ means the acknowledgement we receive must
be our initial sequence number plus 1. Flags = AS means the ACK and
SYN flags were sent in the response. Ops = MNWNNT means the options
in the response must be (in this order):
<MSS (not echoed)><NOP><Window scale><NOP><NOP><Timestamp>
Test 2 involves a NULL with the same options to an open port. Resp=Y
means we must get a response. Ops= means that there must not be any
options included in the response packet. If we took out '%Ops='
entirely then any options sent would match.
Test 3 is a SYN|FIN|URG|PSH w/options to an open port.
This is an ACK to an open port. Note that we do not have a Resp=
here. This means that lack of a response (such as the packet being
dropped on the network or an evil firewall) will not disqualify a
match as long as all the other tests match. We do this because
virtually any OS will send a response, so a lack of response is
generally an attribute of the network conditions and not the OS
itself. We put the Resp tag in tests 2 and 3 because some operating
systems do drop those without responding.
These tests are a SYN, ACK, and FIN|PSH|URG, respectively, to a closed
port. The same options as always are set. Of course this is all
probably obvious given the descriptive names 'T5', 'T6', and 'T7' :).
This big sucker is the 'port unreachable' message test. You should
recognize the DF=N by now. TOS=0 means that IP type of service field
was 0. The next two fields give the (hex) values of the IP total
length field of the message IP header and the total length given in
the IP header they are echoing back to us. RID=E means the RID value
we got back in the copy of our original UDP packet was expected (ie
the same as we sent). RIPCK=E means they didn't fuck up the checksum
(if they did, it would say RIPCK=F). UCK=E means the UDP checksum is
also correct. Next comes the UDP length which was 0x134 and DAT=E
means they echoed our UDP data correctly. Since most implementations
(including this one) do not send any of our UDP data back, they get
DAT=E by default.
The version of Nmap with this functionality is now available
POPULAR SITE SNAPSHOTS
Here is the fun result of all our effort. We can now take random
Internet sites and determine what OS they are using. A lot of these
people have eliminated telnet banners, etc. to keep this information
private. But this is of no use with our new fingerprinter! Also
this is a good way to expose the <your favorite crap OS> users as the
lamers that they are :)!
The command used in these examples was: nmap -sS -p 80 -O -v <host>
Also note that most of these scans were done on 10/18/98. Some of
these folks may have upgraded/changed servers since then.
Note that I do not like every site on here.
# "Hacker" sites or (in a couple cases) sites that think they are
www.l0pht.com => OpenBSD 2.2 - 2.4
insecure.org => Linux 2.0.31-34
www.rhino9.ml.org => Windows 95/NT # No comment :)
www.technotronic.com => Linux 2.0.31-34
www.nmrc.org => FreeBSD 2.2.6 - 3.0
www.cultdeadcow.com => OpenBSD 2.2 - 2.4
www.kevinmitnick.com => Linux 2.0.31-34 # Free Kevin!
www.2600.com => FreeBSD 2.2.6 - 3.0 Beta
www.antionline.com => FreeBSD 2.2.6 - 3.0 Beta
www.rootshell.com => Linux 2.0.35 # Changed to OpenBSD after
# they got owned.
# Security vendors, consultants, etc.
www.repsec.com => Linux 2.0.35
www.iss.net => Linux 2.0.31-34
www.checkpoint.com => Solaris 2.5 - 2.51
www.infowar.com => Win95/NT
# Vendor loyalty to their OS
www.li.org => Linux 2.0.35 # Linux International
www.redhat.com => Linux 2.0.31-34 # I wonder what distribution :)
www.debian.org => Linux 2.0.35
www.linux.org => Linux 2.1.122 - 2.1.126
www.sgi.com => IRIX 6.2 - 6.4
www.netbsd.org => NetBSD 1.3X
www.openbsd.org => Solaris 2.6 # Ahem :) (its because UAlberta
# is hosting them)
www.freebsd.org => FreeBSD 2.2.6-3.0 Beta
# Ivy league
www.harvard.edu => Solaris 2.6
www.yale.edu => Solaris 2.5 - 2.51
www.caltech.edu => SunOS 4.1.2-4.1.4 # Hello! This is the 90's :)
www.stanford.edu => Solaris 2.6
www.mit.edu => Solaris 2.5 - 2.51 # Coincidence that so many good
# schools seem to like Sun?
# Perhaps it is the 40%
# .edu discount :)
www.berkeley.edu => UNIX OSF1 V 4.0,4.0B,4.0D
www.oxford.edu => Linux 2.0.33-34 # Rock on!
# Lamer sites
www.aol.com => IRIX 6.2 - 6.4 # No wonder they are so insecure :)
www.happyhacker.org => OpenBSD 2.2-2.4 # Sick of being owned, Carolyn?
# Even the most secure OS is
# useless in the hands of an
# incompetent admin.
www.lwn.net => Linux 2.0.31-34 # This Linux news site rocks!
www.slashdot.org => Linux 2.1.122 - 2.1.126
www.whitehouse.gov => IRIX 5.3
sunsite.unc.edu => Solaris 2.6
Notes: In their security white paper, Microsoft said about their lax
security: "this assumption has changed over the years as Windows NT
gains popularity largely because of its security features.". Hmm,
from where I stand it doesn't look like Windows is very popular among
the security community :). I only see 2 Windows boxes from the whole
group, and Windows is easy for nmap to distinguish since it is so
broken (standards wise).
And of course, there is one more site we must check. This is the web
site of the ultra-secret Transmeta corporation. Interestingly the
company was funded largely by Paul Allen of Microsoft, but it employs
Linus Torvalds. So do they stick with Paul and run NT or do they side
with the rebels and join the Linux revolution? Let us see:
We use the command:
nmap -sS -F -o transmeta.log -v -O www.transmeta.com//24
This says SYN scan for known ports (from /etc/services), log the
results to 'transmeta.log', be verbose about it, do an OS scan, and
scan the class 'C' where www.transmeta.com resides. Here is the gist
of the results:
neon-best.transmeta.com (126.96.36.199) => Linux 2.0.33-34
www.transmeta.com (188.8.131.52) => Linux 2.0.30
neosilicon.transmeta.com (184.108.40.206) => Linux 2.0.33-34
ssl.transmeta.com (220.127.116.11) => Linux unknown version
linux.kernel.org (18.104.22.168) => Linux 2.0.35
www.linuxbase.org (22.214.171.124) => Linux 2.0.35 ( possibly the same
machine as above )
Well, I think this answers our question pretty clearly :).
The only reason Nmap is currently able to detect so many different
operating systems is that many people on the private beta team went to
a lot of effort to search out new and exciting boxes to fingerprint!
In particular, Jan Koum, van Hauser, Dmess0r, David O'Brien, James
W. Abendschan, Solar Designer, Chris Wilson, Stuart Stock, Mea Culpa,
Lamont Granquist, Dr. Who, Jordan Ritter, Brett Eldridge, and Pluvius
sent in tons of IP addresses of wacky boxes and/or fingerprints of
machines not reachable through the Internet.
Questions and comments can be sent to firstname.lastname@example.org. Nmap can be obtained
from http://insecure.org/nmap .