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Nmap Network Scanning

Bypassing Firewall Rules

While mapping out firewall rules can be valuable, bypassing rules is often the primary goal. Nmap implements many techniques for doing this, though most are only effective against poorly configured networks. Unfortunately, those are common. Individual techniques each have a low probability of success, so try as many different methods as possible. The attacker need only find one misconfiguration to succeed, while the network defenders must close every hole.

Exotic Scan Flags

The previous section discussed using an ACK scan to map out which target network ports are filtered. However, it could not determine which of the accessible ports were open or closed. Nmap offers several scan methods that are good at sneaking past firewalls while still providing the desired port state information. FIN scan is one such technique. In the section called “ACK Scan”, SYN and ACK scans were run against a machine named Para. The SYN scan showed only two open ports, perhaps due to firewall restrictions. Meanwhile, the ACK scan is unable to recognize open ports from closed ones. Example 10.6 shows another scan attempt against Para, this time using a FIN scan. Because a naked FIN packet is being set, this packet flies past the rules blocking SYN packets. While a SYN scan only found one open port below 100, the FIN scan finds both of them.

Example 10.6. FIN scan against stateless firewall

# nmap -sF -p1-100 -T4 para

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for para (
Not shown: 98 filtered ports
22/tcp open|filtered ssh
53/tcp open|filtered domain
MAC Address: 00:60:1D:38:32:90 (Lucent Technologies)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.61 seconds

Many other scan types are worth trying, since the target firewall rules and target host type determine which techniques will work. Some particularly valuable scan types are FIN, Maimon, Window, SYN/FIN, and NULL scans. These are all described in Chapter 5, Port Scanning Techniques and Algorithms.

Source Port Manipulation

One surprisingly common misconfiguration is to trust traffic based only on the source port number. It is easy to understand how this comes about. An administrator will set up a shiny new firewall, only to be flooded with complains from ungrateful users whose applications stopped working. In particular, DNS may be broken because the UDP DNS replies from external servers can no longer enter the network. FTP is another common example. In active FTP transfers, the remote server tries to establish a connection back to the client to transfer the requested file.

Secure solutions to these problems exist, often in the form of application-level proxies or protocol-parsing firewall modules. Unfortunately there are also easier, insecure solutions. Noting that DNS replies come from port 53 and active FTP from port 20, many administrators have fallen into the trap of simply allowing incoming traffic from those ports. They often assume that no attacker would notice and exploit such firewall holes. In other cases, administrators consider this a short-term stop-gap measure until they can implement a more secure solution. Then they forget the security upgrade.

Overworked network administrators are not the only ones to fall into this trap. Numerous products have shipped with these insecure rules. Even Microsoft has been guilty. The IPsec filters that shipped with Windows 2000 and Windows XP contain an implicit rule that allows all TCP or UDP traffic from port 88 (Kerberos). Apple fans shouldn't get too smug about this because the firewall which shipped with Mac OS X Tiger is just as bad. Jay Beale discovered that even if you enable the Block UDP Traffic box in the firewall GUI, packets from port 67 (DHCP) and 5,353 (Zeroconf) pass right through. Yet another pathetic example of this configuration is that Zone Alarm personal firewall (versions up to 2.1.25) allowed any incoming UDP packets with the source port 53 (DNS) or 67 (DHCP).

Nmap offers the -g and --source-port options (they are equivalent) to exploit these weaknesses. Simply provide a port number, and Nmap will send packets from that port where possible. Nmap must use different port numbers for certain OS detection tests to work properly. Most TCP scans, including SYN scan, support the option completely, as does UDP scan. In May 2004, JJ Gray posted example Nmap scans to Bugtraq that demonstrate exploitation of the Windows IPsec source port 88 bug against one of his clients. A normal scan, followed by a -g 88 scan are shown in Example 10.7. Some output has been removed for brevity and clarity.

Example 10.7. Bypassing Windows IPsec filter using source port 88

# nmap -sS -v -v -Pn

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for
Not shown: 1658 filtered ports
88/tcp closed kerberos-sec   

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 7.02 seconds

# nmap -sS -v -v -Pn -g 88

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for
Not shown: 1653 filtered ports
135/tcp  open  msrpc
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds
1025/tcp open  NFS-or-IIS
1027/tcp open  IIS
1433/tcp open  ms-sql-s

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.37 seconds

Note that the closed port 88 was the hint that lead JJ to try using it as a source port. For further information on this vulnerability, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 811832.

IPv6 Attacks

While IPv6 has not exactly taken the world by storm, it is reasonably popular in Japan and certain other regions. When organizations adopt this protocol, they often forget to lock it down as they have instinctively learned to do with IPv4. Or they may try to, but find that their hardware does not support IPv6 filtering rules. Filtering IPv6 can sometimes be more critical than IPv4 because the expanded address space often allows the allocation of globally addressable IPv6 addresses to hosts that would normally have to use the private IPv4 addresses specified by RFC 1918.

Performing an IPv6 scan rather than the IPv4 default is often as easy as adding -6 to the command line. Certain features such as OS detection and UDP scanning are not yet supported for this protocol, but the most popular features work. Example 10.8 demonstrates IPv4 and IPv6 scans, performed long ago, of a well-known IPv6 development and advocacy organization.

Example 10.8. Comparing IPv4 and IPv6 scans

> nmap www.kame.net

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for kame220.kame.net (
Not shown: 984 closed ports
Port       State       Service
19/tcp     filtered    chargen
21/tcp     open        ftp
22/tcp     open        ssh
53/tcp     open        domain
80/tcp     open        http
111/tcp    filtered    sunrpc
137/tcp    filtered    netbios-ns
138/tcp    filtered    netbios-dgm
139/tcp    filtered    netbios-ssn
513/tcp    filtered    login
514/tcp    filtered    shell
2049/tcp   filtered    nfs
2401/tcp   open        cvspserver
5999/tcp   open        ncd-conf
7597/tcp   filtered    qaz
31337/tcp  filtered    Elite

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 34.47 seconds

> nmap -6 www.kame.net

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for 3ffe:501:4819:2000:210:f3ff:fe03:4d0
Not shown: 994 closed ports
Port       State       Service
21/tcp     open        ftp
22/tcp     open        ssh
53/tcp     open        domain
80/tcp     open        http
111/tcp    open        sunrpc
2401/tcp   open        cvspserver

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 19.01 seconds

The first scan shows numerous filtered ports, including frequently exploitable services such as SunRPC, Windows NetBIOS, and NFS. Yet scanning the same host with IPv6 shows no filtered ports! Suddenly SunRPC (port 111) is available, and waiting to be queried by an IPv6-enabled rpcinfo or by Nmap version detection, which supports IPv6. They fixed the issue shortly after I notified them of it.

In order to perform an IPv6 scan, a system must be configured for IPv6. It must have an IPv6 address and routing information. Since my ISPs do not provide IPv6 addresses, I use the free IPv6 tunnel broker service at http://www.tunnelbroker.net. Other tunnel brokers are listed at Wikipedia. 6to4 tunnels are another popular, free approach. Of course, this technique also requires that the target use IPv6.

IP ID Idle Scanning

The IP ID idle scan has a reputation for being one of the most stealthy scan types, since no packets are sent to the target from your real address. Open ports are inferred from the IP ID sequences of a chosen zombie machine. A less recognized feature of idle scan is that the results obtained are actually those you would get if the zombie was to scan the target host directly. In a similar way that the -g option allows exploitation of trusted source ports, idle scan can sometimes exploit trusted source IP addresses. This ingenious scan type, which was originally conceived by security researcher Antirez, is described fully in the section called “TCP Idle Scan (-sI)”.

Multiple Ping Probes

A common issue when trying to scan through firewalled networks is that dropped ping probes can lead to missed hosts. To reduce this problem, Nmap allows a very wide variety of probes to be sent in parallel. Hopefully at least one will get through. Chapter 3, Host Discovery (Ping Scanning) discusses these techniques in depth, including empirical data on the best firewall-busting techniques.


Some packet filters have trouble dealing with IP packet fragments. They could reassemble the packets themselves, but that requires extra resources. There is also the possibility that fragments will take different paths, preventing reassembly. Due to this complexity, some filters ignore all fragments, while others automatically pass all but the first fragment. Interesting things can happen if the first fragment is not long enough to contain the whole TCP header, or if the second packet partially overwrites it. The number of filtering devices vulnerable to these problems is shrinking, though it never hurts to try.

An Nmap scan will use tiny IP fragments if the -f is specified. By default Nmap will include up to eight bytes of data in each fragment, so a typical 20 or 24 byte (depending on options) TCP packet is sent in three tiny fragments. Every instance of -f adds eight to the maximum fragment data size. So -f -f allows up to 16 data bytes within each fragment. Alternatively, you can specify the --mtu option and give the maximum data bytes as an argument. The --mtu argument must be a multiple of eight, and cannot be combined with the -f option.

Some source systems defragment outgoing packets in the kernel. Linux with the iptables connection tracking module is one such example. Do a scan while a sniffer such as Wireshark is running to ensure that sent packets are fragmented. If your host OS is causing problems, try the --send-eth option to bypass the IP layer and send raw ethernet frames.

Fragmentation is only supported for Nmap's raw packet features, which includes TCP and UDP port scans (except connect scan and FTP bounce scan) and OS detection. Features such as version detection and the Nmap Scripting Engine generally don't support fragmentation because they rely on your host's TCP stack to communicate with target services.

Out-of-order and partially overlapping IP fragments can be useful for Network research and exploitation, but that calls for an even lower-level networking tool than Nmap. Nmap sends fragments in order without any overlaps.

If a fragmented port scan gets through, a tool such as Fragroute can be used to fragment other tools and exploits used to attack the host.


Application-level proxies, particularly for the Web, have become popular due to perceived security and network efficiency (through caching) benefits. Like firewalls and IDS, misconfigured proxies can cause far more security problems than they solve. The most frequent problem is a failure to set appropriate access controls. Hundreds of thousands of wide-open proxies exist on the Internet, allowing anyone to use them as anonymous hopping points to other Internet sites. Dozens of organizations use automated scanners to find these open proxies and distribute the IP addresses. Occasionally the proxies are used for arguably positive things, such as escaping the draconian censorship imposed by the Chinese government on its residents. This great firewall of China has been known to block the New York Times web site as well as other news, political, and spiritual sites that the government disagrees with. Unfortunately, the open proxies are more frequently abused by more sinister folks who want to anonymously crack into sites, commit credit card fraud, or flood the Internet with spam.

While hosting a wide-open proxy to Internet resources can cause numerous problems, a more serious condition is when the open proxies allow connections back into the protected network. Administrators who decide that internal hosts must use a proxy to access Internet resources often inadvertently allow traffic in the opposite direction as well. The hacker Adrian Lamo is famous for breaking into Microsoft, Excite, Yahoo, WorldCom, the New York Times, and other large networks, usually by exploiting this reverse-proxy technique.

Nmap does not presently offer a proxy scan-through option, though it is high on the priority list. the section called “SOLUTION: Hack Version Detection to Suit Custom Needs, such as Open Proxy Detection” discusses a way to find open proxies using Nmap version detection. In addition, plenty of dedicated free proxy scanners are available on Internet sites such as Packet Storm. Lists of thousands of open proxies are widespread as well.

MAC Address Spoofing

Ethernet devices (including Wi-Fi) are identified by a unique six-byte media access control (MAC) address. The first three bytes make up an organizationally unique identifier (OUI). This prefix is assigned to a vendor by the IEEE. The vendor is then responsible for assigning the remaining three bytes uniquely in the adapters and devices it sells. Nmap includes a database which maps OUIs to the vendor names they are assigned to. This helps in identifying devices while scanning a network, though this section describes why it can't be completely trusted. The OUI database file, nmap-mac-prefixes, is described in the section called “MAC Address Vendor Prefixes: nmap-mac-prefixes.

While MAC addresses are pre-assigned to ethernet devices, they can be changed with a driver on most current hardware. But since few people change their MAC address (or even know they have one), many networks use them for identification and authorization purposes. For example, most wireless access points provide a configuration option for limiting access to a certain set of MAC addresses. Similarly, some paid or private networks will force you to authenticate or pay after you connect using a web form. Then they will allow you access to the rest of the network based on your MAC address. Given that it is generally easy to sniff MAC addresses (they must be sent in every frame sent and received), and then to spoof that MAC to gain unauthorized access to the network, this form of access control is rather weak. It is also only effective at the edges of a network, since an end-host's MAC address is replaced when traversing a router.

In addition to access control, MAC addresses are sometimes used for accountability. Network admins will record MAC addresses when they obtain a DHCP lease or when a new machine communicates on the network. If network abuse or piracy complaints are received later, they figure out the MAC address based on the IP address and incident time. Then they use the MAC to track down the responsible machine and its owner. The ease of MAC address spoofing undermines this approach to some degree. Even when users are guilty, they may raise the specter of MAC address spoofing to deflect responsibility.

Nmap supports MAC address spoofing with the --spoof-mac option. The argument given can take several forms. If it is simply the number 0, Nmap chooses a completely random MAC address for the session. If the given string is an even number of hex digits (with the pairs optionally separated by a colon), Nmap will use those as the MAC. If fewer than 12 hex digits are provided, Nmap fills in the remainder of the six bytes with random values. If the argument isn't a zero or hex string, Nmap looks through nmap-mac-prefixes to find a vendor name containing the given string (it is case insensitive). If a match is found, Nmap uses the vendor's OUI and fills out the remaining three bytes randomly. Valid --spoof-mac argument examples are Apple, 0, 01:02:03:04:05:06, deadbeefcafe, 0020F2, and Cisco. This option implies --send-eth to ensure that Nmap actually sends ethernet-level packets. This option only affects raw packet scans such as SYN scan or OS detection, not connection-oriented features such as version detection or the Nmap Scripting Engine.

Even when MAC address spoofing isn't needed for network access, it can be used for deception. If I'm at a conference and launch a scan from my Thinkpad with --spoof-mac Apple, suspicious eyes may turn to the MacBook users in the room.

Source Routing

This old-school technique is still effective in some cases. If a particular router on the path is causing you trouble, try to find a route around it. Effectiveness of this technique is limited because packet filtering problems usually occur on or near the target network. Those machines are likely to either drop all source routed packets or to be the only way into the network. Nmap supports both loose and strict source routing using the --ip-options option. For example, specifying --ip-options "L" requests that the packet be loose source routed through those two given IP way points. Specify S instead of L for strict source routing. If you choose strict source routing, keep in mind that you will have to specify every single hop along the path.

For a real-life example of source routing used to evade filtering policies on a modern network, see the section called “A Practical Real-life Example of Firewall Subversion”. While IPv4 source routing is very commonly blocked, the IPv6 form of source routing is much more pervasive. An interesting article on that problem is available at http://lwn.net/Articles/232781/.

If a source routed path to a target machine is discovered with Nmap, exploitability is not limited to port scanning. Ncat can enable TCP and UDP communication over source routed paths (use the -g option).

FTP Bounce Scan

While only a small percentage of FTP servers are still vulnerable, it is worth checking all of your clients' systems for this problem. At a minimum, it allows outside attackers to utilize vulnerable systems to scan other parties. Worse configurations even allow attackers to bypass the organization's firewalls. Details and examples of this technique are provided in the section called “TCP FTP Bounce Scan (-b)”. Example 10.9 shows an HP printer being used to relay a port scan. If this printer is behind the organization's firewall, it can be used to scan normally inaccessible (to the attacker) internal addresses as well.

Example 10.9. Exploiting a printer with the FTP bounce scan

felix~> nmap -p 22,25,135 -Pn -v -b XXX.YY.111.2 scanme.nmap.org

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Attempting connection to ftp://anonymous:-wwwuser@@XXX.YY.111.2:21
Connected:220 JD FTP Server Ready
Login credentials accepted by ftp server!
Initiating TCP ftp bounce scan against scanme.nmap.org (
Adding open port 22/tcp
Adding open port 25/tcp
Scanned 3 ports in 12 seconds via the Bounce scan.
Nmap scan report for scanme.nmap.org (
22/tcp  open     ssh
25/tcp  open     smtp
135/tcp filtered msrpc

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 21.79 seconds

Take an Alternative Path

I hate to overuse the think outside the box cliché, but continually banging on the front door of a well-secured network is not always the best approach. Look for other ways in. Wardial their phone lines, attack subsidiaries who may have special network access, or show up at their offices with Wi-Fi sniffing equipment, or even sneak in and plug into a convenient ethernet jack. Nmap works well through all of these connections. Just make sure that your penetration-testing contract covers these methods before your client catches you in a ninja suit grappling onto their datacenter rooftop.

A Practical Real-life Example of Firewall Subversion

Now that many individual techniques for bypassing firewall rules have been covered, it is time to put them together in a real-life penetration testing scenario. It all started with a post to the SecurityFocus pen-test list from security pro Michael Cain. He and coworker Demetris Papapetrou were penetration testing the internal network of a large corporation and had just bypassed firewall rules meant to prevent one VLAN from accessing another. I was pleased to read that they performed this feat using Nmap, and I wrote them for the whole story. It is both instructional and inspirational in that it demonstrates the value of perseverance and trying every technique you know, even after the most common exploits fail. Don't let that firewall beat you!

The story starts with Michael and Demetris performing an Nmap scan which shows that they are stuck on a heavily filtered network. They can reach some corporate servers, but not any of the (potentially vulnerable) desktop client machines which have to exist somewhere on the network. Perhaps they are on a restricted conference room or lobby network, or maybe a wireless access point set up for corporate guests. Some of the discovered hosts and networks are shown in Example 10.10. A few details in this story (such as IP addresses) have been changed for confidentiality reasons. I will call the target corporation Megacorp.

Example 10.10. Some interesting hosts and networks at Megacorp  - A router/firewall which will give us grief later - Our protagonists are scanning from this machine - files2.megacorp.com; Nmap shows this is a Windows machine
             with port 445 open. - mail.megacorp.com; Nmap OS detection shows that it is 
             Solaris 8. Port 25 is open and accessible. - Nothing shows up here, but many of the IPs have
                reverse-DNS names, so Demetris suspects that a
                firewall may be blocking his probes.  The goal is to
                reach any available hosts on this subnet.

Given the goal of determining if any hosts are hiding on the network, Demetris starts with a simple ping scan using ICMP echo request queries (-PE). The results are shown in Example 10.11.

Example 10.11. Ping scan against the target network

# nmap -n -sn -PE -T4
Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Nmap done: 256 IP addresses (0 hosts up) scanned in 26.167 seconds

The ping scan fails to find any responsive hosts. Demetris is understandably disappointed, but at least it makes this section more interesting and instructive. Perhaps the network truly is empty, but it could also be packed with vulnerable machines which Demetris is blocked from accessing. He needs to dig deeper. In Example 10.12, Demetris chooses one IP on that network and performs a ping scan. He specifies the packet tracing (--packet-trace) and extra verbosity (-vv) options to determine what is going on at the packet level. The reason for choosing just one IP is to avoid a confusing flood of hundreds of packets.

Example 10.12. Packet trace against a single IP

# nmap -vv -n -sn -PE -T4 --packet-trace
Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
SENT (0.3130s) ICMP > echo request (type=8/code=0)
               ttl=41 id=7193 iplen=28 
RCVD (0.3130s) ICMP > host unreachable 
               (type=3/code=1) ttl=255 id=25980 iplen=56 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (0 hosts up) scanned in 0.313 seconds

It seems that Demetris is receiving ICMP host unreachable messages when trying to scan these IPs (or at least this one). Routers commonly do that when a host is unavailable and so they can't determine a MAC address. It is also occasionally caused by filtering. Demetris scans the other hosts on the network and verifies that they behave the same way. It is possible that only ICMP packets are filtered, so Demetris decides to try a TCP SYN scan. He runs the command nmap -vv -n -sS -T4 -Pn --reason All ports are shown as filtered, and the --reason results blame some host unreachable messages and some nonresponsive ports. The nonresponsive ports may be due to rate limiting of host unreachable messages sent by the router. Many routers will only send one of these every few seconds. Demetris can verify whether rate limiting is the cause by running the scan again and seeing if the host unreachable messages come for exactly the same set of ports. If the ports are the same, it may be a specific port-based filter. If Nmap receives host-unreachable messages for different ports each time, rate limiting is likely the cause.

If a filter is causing the problem, it could be a simple stateless firewall as is commonly available on routers and switches. As discussed in previous sections, these sometimes allow TCP ACK packets through unmolested. Demetris repeats the scan, but specifies -sA for an ACK scan rather than -sS. Any unfiltered ports found by the scan would suggest that the ACK packets made it through and elicited a TCP RST response from the target host. Unfortunately, the results were all filtered in this case, just as with the SYN scan.

Demetris decides to try something more advanced. He already knows that port 445 is open on the Windows machine at (files2.megacorp.com) from his initial Nmap scan. While Demetris hasn't been able to reach the network directly, perhaps files2 (being an important company file server) is able to access that IP range. Demetris decides to try bouncing his scans off files2 using the IPID Idle scan. First he wants to ensure that files2 works as a zombie by testing it against—a known-responsive machine with port 25 open. The results of this test are shown in Example 10.13.

Example 10.13. Testing an idle scan

# nmap -vv -n -Pn -sI -p 25

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )

Initiating idle scan against at 13:10
Idle scan using zombie (; Class: Incremental
Even though your Zombie ( appears to be vulnerable to IP ID
sequence prediction (class: Incremental), our attempts have failed.  This
generally means that either the Zombie uses a separate IP ID base for each
host (like Solaris), or because you cannot spoof IP packets (perhaps your ISP
has enabled egress filtering to prevent IP spoofing), or maybe the target
network recognizes the packet source as bogus and drops them

Using as an Idle Zombie didn't work out well. If the problem was due to heavy traffic, he could try again in the middle of the night. The --packet-trace option combined with thorough reading of the section called “TCP Idle Scan (-sI)” could help determine why isn't working as a zombie. Demetris tries the handful of other hosts he has found on the network, and none work as zombies.

Demetris begins to worry about whether he will ever crack into the network. Fortunately, he is an old hand at this and has another trick up his sleeve—IP source routing. In the early days of the Internet (and even today with IPv6), source routing was an important and widely deployed network diagnosis feature. It allows you to specify the hops you want a packet to take to its target rather than relying on normal routing rules. With strict source routing, you must specify every hop. Loose source routing allows you to fill in key IP way points, while normal Internet routing fills in hop details between those way points.

Long ago the networking community reached consensus that source routing is more trouble (particularly for security) than it is worth. Many (if not most) routers are configured to drop source routed IPv4 packets, so some folks have considered the problem fixed since the early 90's. Yet source routing, like SYN flooding and Telnet password sniffing, continues as a rare but potent risk. Demetris tests this attack by ping-scanning files2 ( using packets loose-source-routed through the mail server. Results are shown in Example 10.14.

Example 10.14. Testing source routing

# nmap -n -sn -PE --ip-options "L" --reason

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Host appears to be up, received echo-reply.
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in .313 seconds

Demetris is both surprised and delighted that the test works. He immediately turns his attention to his true target network, repeating his initial ping scan with an additional option: --ip-options "L". This time, Nmap reports that the machine at is responsive. Demetris learns that it wasn't reachable before because the and subnets are on different router VLANs configured to prevent them from communicating to each other. Demetris' source routing technique opened a big loophole in that policy! Demetris follows up with a SYN scan of the machine, as shown in Example 10.15.

Example 10.15. Success at last

# nmap -vv -n -sS -Pn --ip-options "L" --reason

Starting Nmap ( http://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for
Not shown: 988 closed ports
Reason: 988 resets
PORT     STATE    SERVICE              REASON
21/tcp   filtered ftp                  no-response
23/tcp   filtered telnet               no-response
25/tcp   open     smtp                 syn-ack
80/tcp   open     http                 syn-ack
135/tcp  open     msrpc                syn-ack
139/tcp  open     netbios-ssn          syn-ack
443/tcp  open     https                syn-ack
445/tcp  open     microsoft-ds         syn-ack
515/tcp  open     printer              syn-ack
1032/tcp open     iad3                 syn-ack
1050/tcp open     java-or-OTGfileshare syn-ack
3372/tcp open     msdtc                syn-ack
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 21.203 seconds

Demetris omitted OS detection and version detection from this initial scan, but this looks like a Windows machine from the open port profile. Demetris can now connect to and access these ports as long as he uses tools such as Ncat which offer source routing options. I don't know what happens next in the story, but I'm guessing that it involves Demetris fully penetrating the network and then helping the company redesign it more securely.

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